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Abstract
The "Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is the European Union’s basic framework for 
managing the fisheries in the waters of Member states. The CFP was drawn up in 
1970 in order to institutionalise co- operation between the EU member states over 
fisheries management; formal principles were established in 1983 based on Articles 
38 and 39 of the Treaty of Rome, and were later reinforced in Article 3 of the 
(Maastricht) Treaty on European Union."1
This thesis was written as a part of the master program at NHH. Neither the 
institution, the supervisor, nor the censors are - through the approval of this thesis - 
responsible for neither the theories and methods used, nor results and conclusions 
drawn in this work.
        
SUMMARY
My thesis aims to create an overview of the history of the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP) in the European Union (EU), pointing out important challenges with regards to 
accession of new member states, an oversized fishing fleet and lack of fish resources 
and the essence of the current reform, in addition to a short comparison with the 
Norwegian fisheries management. 
Finally the thesis concludes that the CFP has been able to introduce instruments in 
coherence with the ultimate objectives, at the same time as they fail to fulfill the 
objectives and to introduce the necessary elements of an ecosystem approach to 
fisheries management. Therefore it remains to see whether the proposition made by 
the Commission will be completed in the European Parliament and change the future 
outlook fot the European fisheries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
According to the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) "The global fishing fleet is 2-3 
times larger than what the oceans can sustainably support."2 
In addition, the FAO states that "Marine capture fisheries resources are usually 
considered close to full exploitation worldwide with about half of them fully exploited, 
one quarter over exploited, depleted or recovering from depletion and one quarter 
only with some capacity to produce more than they presently do."3
How does the European Union (EU), one of the largest fishing industries and the 
largest market for fish imports, manage their fisheries? The management of a 
common pool resource may be one of the most challenging tasks, as it includes a 
large number coastal nations each with differing and often conflicting interests, 
sharing the same resources. How would the EU manage its fisheries when it involves 
27 different member states, of which the majority have a coastline? The answer came 
in 1983, when the EU introduced the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Since then, the 
CFP has undergone many changes and challenges through the review in 1992 and 
later in the 2002 reform, changing both objectives and measures in order to better 
manage the EU fisheries. However, the EU are again reforming the CFP, and the 
Commission has presented their proposal to the European Parliament, who will be 
discussing the draft and make a decision in 2012. 
In addition to the EU, the largest fishing nation in Europe, Norway is sharing both 
fishing areas and fish stocks with the EU. Furthermore, Norway is the number one 
exporter of fish products to the EU market, and respectively the tenth and third largest 
in terms of volume and export value.4 
Based on the increasingly deteriorating status of the EU fishing industry and the 
decreasing trend of fish resources, in relation to the Norwegian fishing industry, it will 
also be interesting to look at the similarities and differences between the fisheries 
management in the EU compared to Norway. 
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1.1 QUESTIONS
The main question is a result of contact with the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine 
Affairs in Norway. They advised me about the current reform of the Common 
Fisheries Policy in the European Union, hence I ended up with the following 
question; 
How has the development of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in the European 
Union (EU) changed since it began?
In addition, I will like to add some underlying questions that I find important in 
relation to the Common Fisheries Policy in order to answer the main question; 
What are the effects of the changes made in the CFP and are these coherent with 
the objectives of the CFP?
What are the reasons for the changes and the current reform of the CFP?
How is the fisheries management in Norway compared to fisheries management in 
the EU?
1.1.1 Limitations
In this thesis I have selected to limit my field of research to the European Union, with 
additional focus on some of the main fishing nations and member states of the EU, 
namely Spain and Denmark, in addition to Norway. I have chosen these three 
countries as Spain is one of the largest fishing nations in Europe, and Denmark is a 
country differing from Spain regarding geography, economy and characteristics of 
their fishing sector. I have also selected Denmark and Norway because they both are 
important actors in the North Sea, the ICES area IV, and since Norway is the largest 
fishing nation in Europe. 
As I mentioned above, I have selected to look at area IV, the North Sea, since this is 
one of the marine areas in Europe with the highest number of assessed fish stocks, 
implying availability of data and making it possible to check for the effects I would 
like to analyze.
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The relevant time horizon will be limited to the start of the European Union, and more 
specific since the start of the Common Fisheries Policy in 1983 and until today. The 
analysis will be dependent on the availability of data, and therefore in some aspects it 
will only be available for later periods. But again, this will not have a negative effect 
on the analysis, since it will only be relevant to see the effects of the changes made in 
the last decades.  
1.2 STRUCTURE
I will start the thesis with a historical background of the Common Fisheries Policy, 
which will uncover the relevant aspects and theories in fisheries management. 
Furthermore, I will discuss different concepts and theories uncovered in the 
background of the CFP, followed by an analysis of the effects of changes made in the 
CFP, and compare the fisheries management in the EU with Norway. Finally, I will 
have a look at the future outlook for the CFP in relation to the current reform. Before 
that, I will give a short description of the methods used.  
1.3 METHODOLOGY
This part briefly discusses the methods used in the analysis in section 4, in addition to 
the collection of data in relation to both the history of the CFP and the statistical data 
on catches, fishing fleets and the ICES advice. The theory used in this thesis is mainly 
based on theory from the following courses; International Fisheries Management, 
European Integration, Resource Economics and International Economic 
Organizations.  
1.3.1 Research design 
The questions I have asked demands both qualitative and quantitative methods. The 
first will consist of collecting data from people with knowledge, as there already 
exists research on the subject. In addition, vital information is collected directly from 
the EU webpage and other important organs in relation to the Common Fisheries 
Policy. The latter will consist of collecting secondary data on historical catches, 
advice and the development of the fishing fleet to be able to analyze the effects of 
changes in the CFP. 
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1.3.2 Choice of method
The choice of method can, on the basis of my research design, therefore be 
categorized as dual, including both qualitative and quantitative methods. The reason 
why I have selected a dual design is the availability of information, data and reports in 
relation to the CFP. In addition, a quantitative analysis is necessary to see the effects 
and development of the measures used to manage the CFP. Hence I have selected to 
use time-series on catches, the fishing fleets and fish stocks to check for the 
development of the CFP and whether or not it has complied with the objectives. 
Further I have based my thesis on qualitative reviews of official documents on the 
CFP or related to the CFP.  
1.3.3 Operationalization 
As mentioned in 1.1.1, this thesis will focus on the Common Fisheries Policy in the 
EU and in particular the fisheries in the North Sea; one of the most important areas of 
fishing, not only for Norway but for the EU as a whole. Furthermore, Spain and 
Denmark have been selected to be included in my analysis as these are two of the 
largest fishing nations within the EU. A comparison between Norway's fisheries 
policy and the CFP for the EU will highlight differences between the two, and give 
insight in what weaknesses and strengths each policy have. 
1.3.4 Selection of informants
To be able to find answers to the questions asked I started by contacting my thesis 
advisor, Rögnvaldur Hannesson. He was my professor in International Fisheries 
Management, Resource Economics and Petroleum Economics at Norges 
Handelshøyskole, and has information and knowledge about fisheries and fish 
resources. In addition, I contacted the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs as I 
mentioned in 1.1.
Mr. Hannesson recommended me to contact Jan Frederik Danielsen, fisheries advisor 
in the EU delegation from Norway. He has also advised me on where I can find 
relevant information about the current reform. 
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Further I have contacted the Institute of Marine Research in Norway regarding 
statistical data on catches and advice on total allowable catches (TACs) given by the 
International Council for Exploration of the Sea (ICES). 
1.3.5 Data collection
I started this thesis by reading a report I received from my thesis advisor, "A 
Diagnosis of the EU fisheries sector", which gave me an overview of the current 
situation of the CFP. In addition it uncovered relevant sources of information and how 
I could narrow my questions. Because I started this thesis by researching the history 
of the CFP, I collected additional information simultaneously as a part of the 
qualitative reviews and considerations. 
The quantitative method consists of collected secondary data regarding the fishing 
fleet, catches and advice given by the International Council for Exploration of the 
Sea. This data is relevant to see the effects of the changes made in the CFP since the 
establishment in 1983. 
1.3.6 Data analysis
The analysis will consist of a quantitative analysis in mainly two parts; first of the 
fishing fleet, followed by data on catches. Therefore, the analysis will be tied to 
important events or changes made throughout the history of the CFP, to check 
whether or not the changes made have had the desired effect. 
The second part will consist of comparing key elements of an ecosystem approach to 
fisheries management with the measures and characteristics of the CFP, as a 
supplement to look at the economic development of the fishery sector in the EU in 
general terms. Finally, I will compare the development of the CFP with the fisheries 
policy in Norway, to see whether the policies used correlate or not. 
The reason why I have selected to look at data on catches, fishing fleet and advice on 
TACs from the ICES is simple and became clear when mapping the history of the 
CFP. I was recommended by my thesis advisor to narrow my thesis to check for data 
from one specific area with available data. The size of the fishing fleet has been one 
of the main concerns since the creation of the CFP, in addition to the balance between 
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fleet capacity and available fish resources. Therefore, checking the development of 
catches in relation to scientific advice became necessary to better answer the 
questions posed. 
1.3.7 Critical remarks
The analysis in this thesis is based on data from ICES and Eurostat. Figures and 
diagrams derived from these statistics are generated in a program called "Numbers", 
similar to Microsoft Excel. The access to more sophisticated analytical programs has 
been limited, as I have been based in Barcelona during my thesis work. However, the 
figures and diagrams are sufficient to draw an overall picture of the past and current 
situation of the CFP.
Regarding Figure 11, 14, 23, 25 and 27, illustrating the relationship between the 
advised and agreed TAC, it can be mentioned that the ICES does not always 
recommend a specific TAC, and therefore some years are missing on the line showing 
the advised TAC. 
1.3.8 Evaluation 
The evaluation of the results from this thesis can be divided into three different 
perspectives regarding how the data is collected, credibility of the data used and 
transferability referring to whether or not the results can be relevant for other fields or 
in this case, countries. 
Reliability 
The data collected is recommended by key informants, who are knowledgeable on the 
subject of the European fishing industry, implying that the data used in this thesis are 
reliable. Furthermore, I selected to use information from several sources, to increase 
the objectivity of the thesis, and to check whether or not the different sources had 
come to the same conclusions. 
Credibility 
As mentioned above, the results from this thesis will be credible in the sense that the 
analysis is based on data from several sources including the EU, the ICES, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Food and 
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Agriculture Organization (FAO), in addition to literature on the subject. The data is 
mainly collected from Internet sources, which can generally be criticized, hence 
reducing the reliability and credibility. However, the use of more trustworthy sources 
like well known organizations' websites, such as the ones mentioned above, will make 
up for the lack of reliability and credibility by relying on the Internet as a primary 
source of information.   
Transferability 
Transferability refers to whether or not results and methods used can be transferred 
and used in other situations or cases. In this case, the results and the aspects 
highlighted can be used as a learning process, pointing out critical elements regarding 
fisheries management. Therefore, other fishing nations having similar problems may 
become aware of the many critical elements vital in order to manage fisheries in an 
effective way.  
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2. THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON FISHERIES 
POLICY
This chapter presents a selection of important historical events that have affected the 
development of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in the European Union. The first 
is the Treaty of Rome, which was agreed upon in 1957 and was the start of common 
policies within the European Community (later the EU), then consisting only of West 
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. This is followed 
by short summaries of events leading up to the official establishment of the CFP, such 
as the European Fisheries Convention in 1964, the principle agreed of equal access to 
fishing grounds in 1970, Norway's "no" to the EEC and disputes between Iceland and 
Great Britain in 1972, Denmark becoming a member of the EEC in 1973, and the 
formal start of the of the negotiations of the CFP in 1976 and the extension of fishing 
rights. 
This chapter continues with a summary of the establishment of the CFP itself in 1983, 
as well as key historical events since the establishment. These include the 
membership of Spain and Portugal in 1986, the review of the CFP in 1992, and the 
2002 reform of the CFP. This chapter concludes with a section focusing on how the 
current CFP functions. 
2.1 The Treaty of Rome
The Treaty of Rome in 1957 led to the establishment of the European Economic 
Community (EEC), and is important in relation to the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). The CAP fell under the Common Market and was a policy regarding 
agricultural products, also including fishery products.5 Furthermore, the relatively 
comprehensive Treaty went as far as stating in Article 32.4: “The operation and 
development of the common market for agricultural products must be accompanied by 
the establishment of a common agricultural policy.”6 This initiated the start of a 
common agricultural policy, which later also resulted in the Common Fisheries 
Policy. Following Article 33, the objectives of the CAP stress the importance of 
labour, market stability and reasonable prices. In addition it is stated in Article 33.1d: 
“to assure the availability of supplies”7 Which should imply a sustainable use of 
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natural resources in order to maintain a stable supply of agricultural products. I will 
discuss the concept of sustainable fishing in more detail in the theoretical section in 
Chapter 3, but FAO defines sustainable development as: “…the management and 
conservation of the natural resource base, and the orientation of technological and 
institutional change in such a manner as to ensure the attainment and continued 
satisfaction of human needs for present and future generations. Such sustainable 
development (in the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sectors) conserves land, water, 
plant and animal genetic resources, is environmentally non-degrading, technically 
appropriate, economically viable and socially acceptable.”8 
The relevance of the 1957 Treaty to this thesis is not only the contribution in 
understanding the development of the CFP, but also the early focus on sustainability 
in the European fisheries management, a concept which has lived on and escalated in 
importance in policy making without discussing this further.  
2.2 The European Fisheries Convention in 1964 
The European Fisheries Convention of 1964 included the members of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA), (Denmark, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Norway and the United Kingdom)9, and the European Economic Community (EEC) 
consisting of the six founding states in addition to Ireland and Spain. The most 
important outcome of this convention was the agreement on the System of two zones. 
This system consisted of a coastal belt of 0-6 nautical miles, where the coastal state 
had exclusive rights to the resources, and another belt from 6-12 nautical miles, where 
states that had been fishing within this zone between 1953 and 1962 had the right to 
continue fishing within this zone.10 This made the basis for the later agreement 
between the member states of the EC.
2.3 Principle agreement of equal access to fishing grounds in 1970
In 1970, all the members of the EEC agreed on equal access to the waters of all the 
member states, not including the coastal band of 6 nautical miles. This implied that all 
member states could fish in waters 6-12 nautical miles from the coastline of all the 
other member states. There was open access in the rest of the ocean, meaning that 
every actor could fish freely.11 
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The only difference was that the members of the EEC whom had not previously been 
fishing within the zone of 6-12 nautical miles of the other member states could do so, 
while  in the rest of the ocean open access still prevailed.12 However, this did not 
indicate any further differences for the non-members, like Spain, Denmark and 
Norway. This agreement was the early start or basis for the later Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP) in the European Union. 
2.4 Norway's “No” to the EEC and disputes between Iceland and Great 
Britain in 1972
Norway is the largest fishing nation in Europe, followed by Iceland and Denmark13, 
and in 1972, Norway applied for membership in the EEC together with Denmark, the 
UK and Ireland. However, in referendum, a majority voted no to become member. 
The reasons why Norway did not become member of the EEC are many, but one of 
the main arguments was that the equal access rule would weaken Norway's ownership 
of its fish resources tied to the long coastline14 because Norway is one of the top 
exporting countries of fish products, and is the largest contributor in terms of imports 
to the European Union15, which could have had a negative impact on the norwegian 
fisheries. 
When Iceland in 1972 claimed further fishing rights and extended their fishing zone 
from 12 to 50 nautical miles, Great Britain responded by sending out their navy to 
protect their fishing vessels fishing outside the zone of 12 nautical miles, in 
accordance with an agreement reached in 1961, after the first Cod War. The trend of 
Iceland extending their fishing rights together with the United Nations Law of the Sea 
and other nations extending their economic zones initiated the extension of fishing 
rights by other nations.16 
2.5 Denmark becomes a member of the EEC in 1973
Together with Norway, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, Denmark applied for 
membership in the EEC in 1972, and all countries except for Norway became 
members. When Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland entered the EEC, the 
agreement from 1971 of equal access to member states' waters was stopped for a 
period of 10 years, as the new member nations had much higher catches than the 
16
founding member states.17 Article 101 of the Accession Treaty specifies where the 12 
nautical miles and not the 6 nautical miles rule applies18, resulting in some of the new 
members not opening up parts of their 12 nautical miles zone to other members of the 
EEC. Therefore, the entrance into the EEC did not have any direct effect on 
Denmark’s fishery until some years later. 
2.6 Formal start of negotiations of the CFP in 1976 and extending fishing 
rights
In 1976, the United Kingdom extended its fisheries limits in accordance with the 
International Law of the Sea, from 12 to 200 nautical miles. The 200 miles limit 
means that within this area, the sovereign state has the ownership right of the natural 
resources within this area.19 Since the United Kingdom entered the EEC in 1973, this 
decision did not affect the original agreement with the other member states, only that 
these rights became part of the area which the United Kingdom had to share with the 
other member states.20 Later in the 1970s, the ratification of the 200 nautical miles 
limit changed the idea of free access to fish resources. This was initiated by Iceland 
extending their fishing rights further in 1975, which again resulted in disputes with 
Great Britain, the third Cod War, and pressured the community to extend the 
exclusive economic zone in the North Sea and North Atlantic.21 Exclusive economic 
zones were created and agreed upon in 1977, which affected the ongoing negotiations 
between Norway and the EEC. The reciprocal agreement on fishing was not signed 
until 1980 and regarded the allowance of vessels from the EEC to fish in the 
Norwegian zone and vice versa. Furthermore, Norway and the EEC agreed on 
cooperation in protecting and managing fish resources.22 
2.7 Official start of the CFP in 1983
The Common Fisheries Policy was set in force in January 1983 and consisted of four 
main points of importance concerning economic and biological as well as social 
aspects of the European fisheries. These four main points centered around; 
• Sustainable use of fish stocks;
• and development of fishing fleets and aspects related to the fishing sector; 
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• in addition to a common organization for the market;
• and agreements and fisheries policy towards third countries not part of the 
community.23 
The CFP included conservation and management of fish stocks as well as a guarantee 
of income and future employment for fishermen, in addition to supplying the market 
with fish products at a reasonable price. As early as 1983, the problems related to an 
oversized fishing fleet became apparent. The EEC became aware of the challenges 
regarding the inclusion of Spain and Portugal in the community, resulting in an 
oversized fishing fleet and therefore a problem with overfishing, hence making the 
maintenance of a stable supply to the markets more difficult. The most important 
feature of the CFP was the harmonization between member states regarding their 
structural policies. The Common Fisheries Policy agreed upon in 1983 was originally 
set for 20 years, but later it was agreed for a midterm review.24 
Since the creation of the CFP, the agreement between Norway and the EEC regarding 
reciprocal fishing has been regulated with annual agreements on quotas.25  
2.8 Spain (and Portugal) become members of the EEC in 1986
One of the main concerns with Spain entering the European Economic Community 
was the fact that the size of their fishing fleet was larger than that of the EEC. 
Therefore the member states of the EEC had incentives to restrict the access of the 
Spanish fleet to the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).26 Spain entered the EEC in 
January 1986 with limited access to the other member states' waters. They were, 
however, not admitted to be a part of the CFP, since the rest of the community was 
having problems with oversized fishing fleets.27 In addition to problems regarding the 
CAP as well as the CFP, long negotiations were required in order to come to a 
solution for Spain entering the European Community. Also, the free movement of the 
labour force was a strong argument against letting Spain become part of the EEC, as 
unemployment was relatively high in Spain during the beginning of the 1980s.28 
Spain and Portugal indirectly became part of the new approach to fisheries 
management agreed upon in 1983, as they were not admitted access to the other 
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member states' fishing zones. Hence, the preservation of fish stock measure applied 
for the new member states. 
2.9 Review of the CFP in 1992
The first review and reform of the Common Fisheries Policy came in 1992, the 
necessity of which arose from the trend of overcapacity and downward trends in fish 
resource. The review was of great importance, as Spain and Portugal desired equal 
access to Member states' waters. In addition to the accession of Spain and Portugal, 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the unification of Germany led to further 
challenges for the CFP, because the fishing fleet of former East Germany was 
characterized by overcapacity and old equipment. Accession of several coastal states 
made it clear that the CFP needed to change to be better equipped to handle these new 
challenges.29 The new principles of the CFP for the next decade were30; 
• sustainable exploitation of fish stocks;
• balancing fishing effort and fish resources;
• further improvement of the enforcement of the current Community rules;
• better policy coordination of the CFP in relation to other policies; 
• and distribution of responsibility. 
The review of the CFP stressed the importance of matching the fleet capacity with the 
availability of fish resources, but also stressed the importance of social and economic 
effects resulting from reducing the fishing fleet. The original objectives from the 1983 
creation of the CFP also stressed the importance of fleet reduction to prevent further 
overexploitation of fish stock. However, the imbalance between the fishing fleet and 
fish catch potential was even greater during the 1990s. Therefore, the CFP needed to 
tackle this imbalance in a more effective way, and introduced structural measures to 
compensate for the reduction of the Community fleet.31 The review in 1992 also 
introduced the concept of fishing effort. OECD defines fishing effort as "...a measure 
of the amount of fishing"32, but they also mention that the European Union defines it 
as fleet capacity, which can be expressed as tonnage/engine power multiplied with 
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time at sea, often expressed in days.33 The concept of fishing effort was introduced to 
further and more effectively reduce the fleet capacity. In addition to introducing more 
areas with limited fishing, e.g. The Norway Pout Box in the North Sea to protect the 
Norwegian pout and sand eel, a new measure was the creation of fishing licenses from 
the beginning of 1995.34 These new and more rigid measures introduced in the 1992 
review of the CFP were also created due to new accession of coastal states such as 
Sweden, Finland and Norway. However, Norway again did not become a member 
because a second referendum ended with the same conclusion as in 1972. The 
changes made to the CFP were to last until the reform in 2002.
Further negotiations on the agreement between Norway and the EU from 1980 took 
place in 1992, which resulted in an addition to the total allowable catch on Northeast 
Arctic Cod (formerly known as Arcto-Norwegian cod) in the Norwegian economic 
zone to the EU until 1997. The additional quotas given to the EU was compensated 
with equivalent quotas given to Norway.35 
2.10 Spain and Portugal demanding full membership of the CFP from 
1996
As mentioned above, when Spain and Portugal entered the EEC in 1986 they did not 
obtain full access to EEC waters and were not included in the CFP. In 1994, Spain and 
Portugal demanded better conditions and full inclusion in the CFP if they were going 
to accept the accession of new members. This demand did not come without 
complications, because the other members of the EEC already were having problems 
with overcapacity and overfishing. The agreement that was set into force in the 
beginning of 1996 did allow Spanish fishing vessels access to most of the EU waters, 
but they did not receive quotas to fish in these areas. They could therefore not fish for 
quota fish, e.g. cod, in these areas.36
2.11 The 2002 Reform of the CFP
When creating the Common Fisheries Policy in 1983, the member states of the EEC 
agreed on an aforementioned set of objectives that attempted to maintain the use of a 
common resource, namely fish. After several challenges regarding new accession of 
coastal states, the International Law of the Sea, the creation of the World Trade 
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Organization, etc. created pressure for changes in the CFP, in addition to more 
scientific evidence of overfishing and poor economic performance for the EU 
fisheries. This situation resulted in a reorientation of the objectives of the CFP. The 
change gave the same priority to environmental, economic and social aspects related 
to the CFP, stressing that sustainable use of fish resources through stable incomes for 
fishermen and the importance of a balance between marine resources and supply to 
consumers.37 The reform of 2002 resulted in three new regulations which came into 
force on the 1st of January 2003: 
"COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the 
conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common 
Fisheries Policy"38
"COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2369/2002 of 20 December 2002 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements 
regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector "39
"COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2370/2002 of 20 December 2002 establishing an 
emergency Community measure for scrapping fishing vessels"40
In addition to the new regulations, the new CFP stressed the importance of a long-
term approach to tackle the problems with stocks not being within safe biological 
limits through multi-annual recovery plans. Furthermore, they created multi-annual 
management plans for other stocks to prevent them from being overfished. In order to 
do this they were dependent on scientific advice on how to set quotas, and chose a 
precautionary approach based on advice from the ICES. In addition, emergency 
measures to assist the protection of the common resources were established. These 
measures were to be set by the Commission and could last for 6 months with a further 
extension of 6 more months if necessary. Member States would also be able to set up 
measures to protect their resources, but only within their 12 nautical miles zone for a 
period of 3 months. 
Because one of the main challenges was the overcapacity of the fleet, and the fact that 
the former measures proved not sufficient to deal with this problem, the matter of aid 
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was changed to not be counteractive to the goal of reducing the fleet capacity. 
Therefore member states and the commission only were to give aid to measures taken 
with the result of improving the fleet but not without reducing its capacity. Examples 
includes the improvement of working conditions aboard fishing vessels or measures 
to reduce by-catches through selective fishing techniques or to have a vessel 
monitoring system (VMS) aboard. This system would replace the Multi-Annual 
Guidance Programmes (MAGPs), which has not been an effective management tool 
to limit fleet capacity. 
To further reduce the overcapacity of the fleet, the Community introduced a scrapping 
fund in order to tackle the effects of scrapping vessels, and compensate fishermen 
who are affected by restructuring. It contributed with premiums in addition to those 
available under the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) regarding 
structural problems, 20% higher than those already existing for decommissioning 
under the FIFG.41 The FIFG's goal was to contribute to the balance between the size 
of stocks and fishing effort, better competitiveness, improve supplies to market and 
maintain and strengthen areas dependent on fishing.42 They also contributed to 
reduction of the fleet with aid to transfers of EU vessels to third countries. 
Regarding access to fishing grounds and resources, the same principle as earlier was 
intact; in the 6-12 nautical miles zone the sovereign state in addition to the nations 
that have been fishing within this zone earlier can continue do so. Outside the 12 
nautical miles zone the Council would make decisions in coherence with the CFP, 
while limited areas such as the Shetland Box should remain to sustain and secure 
certain fish stocks.43 
Another important element of the 2002 reform was the importance of better control of 
fisheries, both in terms of effectiveness and transparency. The  creation of a 
Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) coordinated and stressed the 
importance of cooperation and coordination between member states to better handle 
the situation of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) in addition to 
normal control mechanisms.
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However, the most important feature of the reform was the creation of regional organs 
to better include the local community, fishermen and other stakeholders. The North 
Sea Regional Advisory Council (NSRAC) was one of seven RACs created in 2004. 
Their responsibilities are to communicate with the Commission on problems related 
to their area and can recommend changes to be made.44 
The final element of the reform was the creation of several action plans to clarify 
some problems of the CFP. Most of them are related to environmental protection, 
IUU, discards of fish, control and inspection and consequences of the CFP. 
2.12 Today’s CFP
The next review of the CFP was scheduled for 2012, 10 years after the reform in 
2002. However, since the start of the CFP in 1983, the 2002 reform represented the 
largest challenge and change to the Common Fisheries Policy. The effects of the 
reform are already visible but it remains to see what conclusions will be made in the 
current review of the CFP. Since the reform in 2002, a gradual implementation of the 
changes has been adopted, the effects of the changes of which will become apparent 
in the years to come. 
The effects are evaluated in the current situation where the Commission is proposing 
changes in the CFP to better meet previously set objectives. This work focuses on 
failures, problems and challenges of the CFP, which measures have complied with 
goals and which need to be adjusted or require more time to fulfill their purpose. 
Since the 2002 reform the total annual catches in all the regions of the EU have 
declined. This decline indicates that the new conservation measures generated under 
the reform have not had a significant effect on the conservation of fish stocks. Some 
of the new measures need time to implement and generate an effect on the 
development of fish stocks, but in any case, indications in the Commission Staff 
Working Document: A Diagnosis of the EU fisheries sector (22.04.2009) are that a 
large number of fish stocks are not at a safe biological level. In the North Sea almost 
all stocks are overfished, again indicating that the measures taken by the EU have not 
been sufficient to stabilize nor to provide an economically sustainable fishery.45 
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There are many reasons for the current new reform of the CFP, as mentioned above, 
there exist economic reasons as well as environmental reasons for the new reform. 
The reasons are still the same as in the previous reforms; to change the CFP in order 
to make it more adept to meet the objectives stated. The problem with overcapacity is 
still present and has been present since the start of the CFP in 1983. The diagnosis of 
the EU fisheries sector (22.04.2009) discusses various challenges with the current 
CFP, its shortcomings and important aspects that need attention. I will focus more on 
this part in the analytical section, as these challenges and changes are part of the 
current reform. 
I will take a more detailed look at the statistics of fleet capacity, annual catches, fish 
stocks and TACs and quotas agreed upon in the European Council in relation to 
scientific advice from the ICES in the analytical section presented in Chapter 4. 
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3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In this part I will discuss some of the theoretical background for fisheries 
management. The main measures used under the Common Fisheries Policy in the EU 
have been established to achieve the objectives. One of the most important objectives 
or worries has been the size of the fishing fleet. Therefore, measures such as the 
restriction of the use of some types of fishing gear or days allowed at sea, or setting 
quotas to limit the fishing capacity have been put in place. This section starts with a 
discussion of some of the different ways the EU has been managing fisheries under 
the CFP, and concludes with a discussion of some important aspects and concepts in 
relation to fisheries management. 
3.1 FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
Instead of focusing on a definition of fisheries management, I find it more important 
to stress what fisheries management is in the sense of which tasks are important. As 
Cochrane puts it; "The integrated process of information gathering, analysis, 
planning, consultation, decision-making, allocation of resources and formulation and 
implementation, with enforcement as necessary, of regulations or rules which govern 
fisheries activities in order to ensure the continued productivity of the resources and 
the accomplishment of other fisheries objectives."46 In this sense, fisheries 
management implies that it should be a continuous process, adapting to any 
economic, social and environmental changes. For this reason I will discuss some of 
the different measures for managing fisheries, which I have mentioned in the previous 
chapter on the history of the CFP. I will take a historical view of various measures 
used in the CFP throughout its lifetime, by starting with the most obvious 
management method; open or free access to fishing grounds. 
3.1.1 Open access or free access
Historically, before the creation of limited fishing zones under the European Fisheries 
Convention of 1964 and the recognition of the 200 nautical miles exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) by more countries in the 1970s, most fishing grounds or waters were 
subject to free access, implying that anybody wanting to fish in an area could do so 
without any specific limitations or controls. A free access fishery is "...typically 
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characterized by many independent decision units, a decision unit typically being a 
skipper or a boat owner..., and less frequently a fishing firm with many boats. The 
essential point of this is that no single decision maker can control the fish stock by his 
own action. If somebody decides to leave some fish unharvested today in order to take 
them tomorrow, he has no assurance that they will be there tomorrow as long as 
others can take them in the meantime. The fisherman who catches fish from a stock to 
which many others have access thus has a good reason to take as much as he can as 
quickly as possible." 47 This concept leads to a large fleet capacity, often overcapacity 
and overexploitation of fish stocks resulting from too many boats. Relating this to one 
of the main problems with the CFP is not difficult, as it has been present since the 
start of the EU and the CFP. Still, the Commission is trying to solve the problem with 
overcapacity and this is one of the most important aspects of the current reform. The 
only limitation to an open access fishery is the cost in relation to the size of the stock. 
If the costs of fishing increase as the stock shrinks, due to fishing, fishing will stop 
itself as there is no profit to gain from continued fishing. This happens when the price 
per unit of fish equals the cost per unit of fish. 
Regarding the characteristics of a free access fishery, as I mentioned above, the 
possibility of short term profits creates incentives for the actors to fish more now in 
fear of others taking more now than later. This increases the fishing pressure on the 
fish stocks and in the long run reduces the reproductive possibilities of the fish stock. 
This eventually can lead to a stock level below a biologically sustainable level, and a 
worst case scenario can lead to extinction. Another possibility is that if the cost of 
fishing gets sufficiently low or the price of fish gets sufficiently high it could lead the 
free access fishery to the point of extinction for the fish stocks. In an open access 
fishery the only reason for leaving anything behind is in order to let the stock to grow 
again. This does not make much sense as most fishermen have a short-term view 
because of the large number of fishers. 
3.1.2 Limited access and property rights
The first step of the CFP was to exclude actors outside the EU from the EUs exclusive 
economic zone, meaning reducing the number of actors in some areas. After the 
ratification of the fishing zones with limits in 1964, the concept of free access became 
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more limited in the sense that the national state had the sovereign rights to the 
resources within the 0-6 nautical miles zone, and other nations of the EU had only a 
limited access to the second zone of 6-12 nautical miles. However, since most of the 
fish stocks are outside this zone, the limitations did not have any large effects on 
preserving fish stocks. Further it did to some extent reduce the number of actors or  
active fishing fleet within this limited zone of the EU. 
Another way of controlling the access to fish resources was the introduction of a 
licensing system in the 1992 review. A fish license is defined by the OECD "...as a 
permit, a license or permit is a document authorising the taking of fish according to 
the terms established by the regulating authority."48 A licensing system was 
introduced under the 1992 review to regulate the access to fish resources. 
Further the EU has closed or limited access to certain areas for fishing to conserve 
some of the most important areas for spawning, like the marine protected area (MPA) 
in the North Sea, the Norway Pout Box, as I mentioned in chapter 2.9, the FAO 
defines MPAs as "...temporally and geographically defined areas that afford natural 
resources greater protection than is afforded in the rest of an area as defined in 
relation to fisheries management (e.g. The fishery, ecosystem or zone constituting the 
management unit), i.e. a no-take area to protect spawning of a certain fish species 
targeted by a fishery or an area with specific gear prohibitions."49 The North Sea has 
several MPAs, and figure 1 below shows some of the most important ones50;
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3.1.3 Effort management
In the 1992 CFP review, new regulations to handle the imbalance between fishing 
capacity and available fish resources were introduced. One aspect of the regulation 
was the concept of fishing effort. With the EU's definition of fishing effort as fishing 
capacity previously explained, I will now discuss the concept of fishing capacity 
further. 
Compared to other sectors, defining capacity in fishing is a bit more complicated. The 
main reason for this complication is the fact that the "producer", or the fisherman, has 
little or no control of the fish resource. As mentioned under free access, one single 
actor, a fisherman, cannot alone affect the fish stock. In addition, fish resources are 
free and the size of the stock can vary to a large extent. The result is a diverse range of 
definitions.51 As mentioned, the EU defines fleet capacity as tonnage/engine power 
multiplied with time at sea.52 The FAO defines fishing capacity as "...the amount of 
fish (or fishing effort) that can be produced of a period of time (e.g. a year or a 
fishing season) by a vessel or a fleet if fully utilized and for a given resource 
condition."53 The output produced, or catch of fish, is not only dependent on the fish 
effort, the type of fish gear and the use intensity, but also on the size of the fish stock. 
Furthermore, the size of the fish stock is dependent on the fishing mortality, which is 
 Figure 1: Marine Protected Areas in the North Sea
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easily defined by the ICES as "...deaths caused by fishing."54 In this sense, we can 
define input as fishing effort or fishing mortality. The input used therefore affects the 
fishing mortality, which is also dependent on the size of the utilization of the fishing 
fleet. If we do not have a problem with overcapacity, input management will not be a 
crucial factor.
This brings us to the topic of overcapacity, indicating that the fleet capacity is larger 
than what is needed to catch the total allowable catch (TAC) given for a fish stock in 
accordance with the definition given by the FAO. TAC can be defined as "...The 
quantity of fish that can be taken from each stock each year. In the European Union, 
the figure is agreed by the Fisheries Council of Ministers each December for the 
following year. EU Member States are allocated a fixed proportion of the total 
allowable catch as their national quota."55 In this respect it is important to stress the 
difference between long-term and short-term overcapacity. The short-term 
overcapacity is not to the same extent important as the long-term, because the short-
term overcapacity can result from fluctuations in the fish stock. However, if the 
natural fluctuations are not accounted for, a relatively small fish stock can experience 
severe damages due to short-term overcapacity. While long-term overcapacity can 
have an impact on fish resources and the economy of the fishing industry. In the late 
1990s, S. M. Garcia and C. Newton made an estimation of the world fishing capacity, 
stressing that the world fishing capacity should be reduced by 25% for operating costs 
to be covered by revenues, and a further reduction of 53% to cover total costs.56 This 
underlined the need for new measures to reduce the overcapacity in the EU fishing 
fleet, which was already stressed as a problem back in 1983. 
Before defining overcapacity, fleet capacity or fishing capacity can be described in 
two different ways, depending on inputs or outputs. Starting with the latter, in terms 
of output, capacity "...can be considered as the maximum harvest level that a 
fisherman or a fleet can produce with given levels of inputs, such as fuel, amount of 
fishing gear, ice, bait, engine horsepower and vessel size."57 In this sense, 
overcapacity, defined in the same terms would indicate that, given the levels of input, 
the capacity would be higher than the given TACs. In terms of input, capacity can be 
defined as "...the minimum fleet and effort required to produce a given total allowable 
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catch or given output (harvested catch) level." 58 In this sense, overcapacity would 
mean that the capacity exceeds the minimum fleet required to catch the given TAC. 
The EU introduced several measures in the 1992 regulation as a mean to adjust the 
imbalance between fish resources and factors affecting the fishing mortality. They 
state in the Council Regulation (EEC) No 3760/92 of 20 December 1992 that "...for 
the purposes of rational and responsible exploitation of resources, the selectivity of 
fishing methods and gear should be improved with a view to optimum utilization of 
biological potential and limitation of discards" 59. Therefore I would like to discuss 
different measures for managing fishing effort. 
The most common way of managing fishing effort are controls of inputs. Input 
controls imply restrictions on the use of fishing gear used in fisheries. We can 
separate these into three different types of controls, the first being fishing capacity 
controls which limit the size or number of fishing vessels in a given area. The second 
type of control refers to the time the fishing vessels are allowed to fish in the given 
area, named vessel usage controls, and is complementary to the first type of control. It 
is complementary in the sense that if one has a problem with overcapacity, limiting 
fishing capacity is possible by adjusting the time dimension, or time allowed to fish. 
The last, fishing effort controls, is a combination of the two previous, and implies 
restrictions on the capacity or usage. In addition, limitations on the amount of fuel 
may exist, but the most common way of input controls are limitations on fishing 
effort.60 The main purpose of using input controls under an effort management is to 
lower the capacity of the fishing fleet. This is a way of reducing the fleet capacity 
without any physical reduction in the number of boats. If one has control of the fleet 
capacity, it will not be necessary to control how much it is utilized. However, it is 
difficult to maintain control of capacity, as fluctuations in the fish stocks will require 
some minimum control and adjustment from year to year. Another problem with input 
controls is the incentives to substitute the restricted factor for another factor, e.g. 
limiting the days allowed to fish can be substituted with more effort used during the 
days at sea. Additionally, it can create incentives to substitute the restrictions with 
increasing the technical efficiency of the boats, just to catch more fish in the period 
given.61 
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3.1.4 Catch management
Another way of managing fisheries is by catch management, or output controls. 
Compared to input controls, this implies direct limits on catches. TAC falls under this 
category, and the first output measure introduced in the CFP to preserve the fish 
resources was the total allowable catch (TAC) which I defined under section 3.1.3.  
The quotas given usually result in conservation of the fish resources, but if this is the 
only way of managing fishing, fishing effort will increase as long as there exists a 
possibility of profit, revenues being higher than the costs of fishing, and the fishermen 
or fishing firms will still have incentives to invest in a bigger boat or better fishing 
equipment to be able to take a larger part of the quota. This will increase the cost of 
fishing until all the possible rent is gone. Therefore, TACs might serve to protect and 
conserve the fish resources, but it can also lead to excessive investment in the fishing 
fleet. 
Under this section an important element to consider is the problem with discards.62 
The definition of discards used by the FAO is "...discarded catch is that portion of the 
total organic material of animal origin in the catch, which is thrown away, or dumped 
at sea for whatever reason. It does not include plant materials and post harvest waste 
such as offal. The discards may be dead, or alive." 63 It is not clear how much discards 
amount to of total catches, but if TACs are set sufficiently low to reduce the fishing 
pressure, and still the stock is declining, it might be due to large discards of unwanted 
fish that are often replaced by larger and more valuable fish. 
Hence there exist some different approaches to make sure that the TACs set are not 
exceeded; the first is simple and implies "...Free fishing until the total allowable catch 
is taken and then shutting the fishery down" 64, while the second divides the TAC by 
several periods, and closes fishing when the allocation is caught within each period. 
The first implies intense competition to catch a large proportion of the TAC before 
anyone else does. The result will be excessive capacity and more effort used than 
necessary, hence increasing costs. The same will most likely happen under the second 
approach, however it would result in a distribution of the catch throughout the year. 
The third regards "Allocating proportions of the TAC to various sectors and leaving 
them to manage their own share themselves" 65, implying that the sector will decide 
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themselves when to catch their proportion of their quota. The last approach is to do 
the same as under the third, but to individuals or individual vessels. The biggest 
drawback of the two last approaches is the administrative part and collection of catch 
statistics. 
3.1.5 Individual Transferable Quotas
The OECD defines an individual transferable quota (ITQ) as "A type of quota (a part 
of a Total Allowable Catch) allocated to individual fishermen or vessel owners and 
which can be sold to others." 66 ITQs are part of the catch management or output 
controls, and are a way of allocating the TAC between fishermen or fishing firms. 
However, compared to input controls, technological process under output controls, 
like ITQs, does not result in depletion of the stock but rather in more efficient fishing. 
In the short term, small ITQs indicate that more efficient firms can lease quotas from 
less efficient firms which results in better utilization of the fleet. In the long term, 
fishermen can invest in appropriate boats for their quota, or alternatively buy quotas 
from fishermen who are leaving to have a sufficient basis for a boat of optimal size.67 
Some of the problems related to ITQs are tied to enforcement and control of discards 
and underreporting. ITQs may create strong incentives for the fishermen to replace 
less valuable fish and underreport actual catches. "Every fish not reported is a licence 
to catch the same quantity later in a legal manner" 68 which affects individual quotas 
in general, not only ITQs. Furthermore, this complicates the problem with deciding 
TACs, because actual catches are much higher than reported. Another problem is how 
to distribute the ITQs when first given. If they are given for free, the fishermen will 
gain, but only the first generation, since they are gaining a right to fish from a 
common resource without any expense. The allocation of ITQs can also be done by 
auctions, but the main point is that nobody should lose regardless of how the quotas 
are distributed.69 
Furthermore, the ITQ can be set as a fixed amount of the TAC or as a share of it. The 
first case will reduce the risk for the fishermen, since they will be certain of an 
income, while in the other case, they will be present to all the risk due to variability in 
the TAC.  
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Because the EU has recognized overcapacity as one of the main problems with the 
CFP, it is relevant to discuss subsidies and structural aid because they have been an 
important instrument or measure for the social aspect of reducing and regulating the 
fishing fleet. 
3.1.6 Subsidies and structural aid
The only definition of subsidies that is internationally legally agreed upon is the one 
stated in the World Trade Organization Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (ASCM). In Article 1 of the ASCM, subsidies are defined as "(i) a financial 
contribution by a government or any public body, where a financial contribution can 
involve a direct transfer of funds, a potential direct transfer (such as through a loan 
guarantee), foregone government revenue, government provision of goods and 
services other than general infrastructure, and government purchases of goods, (ii) by 
a government or any public body within the territory of a Member, and (iii) which 
confers a benefit."70
In the 1992 review of the CFP, structural measures were introduced to ease the social 
impact of reducing the EU fishing fleet.71 How far this can be characterized as 
subsidies or not depends on the definition used. According to the OECD, in addition 
to what is covered in the WTO definition, they also include "...transfers related to 
management, research and enforcement, fisheries access agreements, and fisheries 
specific infrastructure."72 According to this definition, restructuring the fishing fleet 
and supporting the fishermen affected with structural aid is defined as subsidies. 
It is important to distinguish between direct and indirect subsidies, where direct 
subsidies are direct transfers of money to a beneficiary, and include e.g. vessel 
decommissioning programs. The latter refers to no direct transfers of money, but 
could include free access to fishing grounds. By including this, subsidies can in many 
instances damage the development in the fishing industry, but this is discussed further 
in the Analysis Chapter. 
3.1.7 Stabilizing catches 
The question regarding whether or not we should stabilize catches are discussed, and 
the reasons are the advantages of having a stable catch. First of all it will benefit the 
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utilization of fishing effort, and having a stable production both satisfies the 
fishermen with a stable income and a stable supply of fish products to the market. 
Hence the CFP might have tried to achieve this when setting the objective of relative 
stability. However, stabilizing catches indicate that a fixed amount of fish is taken in 
every period. It should therefore be mentioned that if the size of the stock fluctuates 
randomly, which is often the case, the effort needed to catch the same amount in every  
period would require different levels of effort. Therefore, stabilizing catches indicate a 
variable use of effort, while a variable catch indicates a stable use of effort. Even 
though stable catches might result in higher revenues, it will be more expensive. 
Hence it is not possible to conclude that the one is better than the other. It will be 
more practical to catch a fixed share of the stock, instead of a fixed amount of fish, 
since this will account for natural fluctuations as a result of other factors than fishing, 
such as environmental fluctuations.73    
3.1.8 Ecosystem approach to fisheries management
An ecosystem approach to fisheries management implies taking measures to 
"...protect and conserve living aquatic resources, to provide for their sustainable 
exploitation and to minimize the impact of fishing activities on marine eco-systems. It 
shall aim at a progressive implementation of an eco-system-based approach to 
fisheries management. It shall aim to contribute to efficient fishing activities within an 
economically viable and competitive fisheries and aquaculture industry, providing a 
fair standard of living for those who depend on fishing activities and taking into 
account the interests of consumers." 74 This is further stressed in Regulation 
2371/2002; "The Common Fisheries Policy shall ensure exploitation of living aquatic 
resources that provides sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions."75 
The most important aspect of an ecosystem approach to fisheries management 
includes focus on how fishing affects marine ecosystems, including effects on 
targeted species as well as by-catch on non-commercial species.76 In addition to this, 
the ecosystem approach should take into consideration the mixed-fishery management 
method, meaning that fishing for one target species also has effects on other species 
that are caught together with the wanted one. 
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In this sense, an ecosystem approach should include long term management plans or 
multi-annual management plans that target a reduction of "...fishing pressure to 
sustainable levels, targeting activities having adverse effects on the sustainability of 
fish stocks" 77 , in addition it should "...achieve ‘favourable conservation status’ of non 
commercial species and habitats; as well as reducing discards, incidental by catch 
and impacts on habitats by improving fishing methods"78 and lastly it should 
"...develop an Action Plan on discards, and proposals to protect sharks, cetaceans 
and sea birds from the adverse effects of fishing."79
FAO defines an ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) management as an approach 
that "...strives to balance diverse societal objectives, by taking into account the 
knowledge and uncertainties about biotic, abiotic and human components of 
ecosystems and their interactions and applying an integrated approach to fisheries 
within ecologically meaningful boundaries." 80 Further FAO states that an EAF does 
use the same traditional management methods, the only difference is how they are 
applied to comply with the objectives stated above. 
Some of the most important aspects in an EAF are technical measures, data collection, 
scientific advice, ecological risk assessment and defining the role of the RACs. In 
addition transparency and accountability are important aspects for speeding up 
implementation of the new measures. Further regionalization of the CFP can assist the 
implementation of the ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management. 
The final point is the importance of sustainable use of marine resources under an 
EAF, which I will discuss later in 3.3. 
As mentioned under chapter 3.11 concerning the 2002 reform, as part of the EAF, the 
reform stressed the importance of a precautionary approach to fisheries management 
based on scientific advice from the ICES. The precautionary approach is part of an 
ecosystem approach to fisheries management, in the sense that we should take into 
consideration scientific research about the state of current fish stocks and marine 
habitats. The OECD defines the precautionary principles with regards to renewable 
resources as "...Renewable resources should not be used in excess of their natural 
regeneration." 81 In this sense, information is crucial to be able to set adequate 
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objectives and measures for a precautionary approach to fisheries management. The 
ICES stresses that information is vital in the precautionary approach, as part of the 
advice given by the ICES since 1998. The advice given consists "...of a framework of 
biological reference points, related to upper exploitation boundaries." 82 Furthermore, 
the ICES says that "Management decisions for sustainable fisheries should restrict the 
risk that the spawning biomass falls below a minimum limit, or that the fishing 
mortality rate becomes too high."83 Therefore the ICES has defined a minimum level 
of spawning stock biomass and an equal limit for maximum fishing mortality. Hence, 
it will be the task of management to prevent levels inferior to the biomass limit and 
superior to the fishing mortality. Since exceeding these limits can result in reduced 
productivity of the fish stock, that will affect future productivity. In addition to these 
limits, the ICES has set two similar limits, inferior to the minimum levels, to account 
for fluctuations in the fish stocks, called the precautionary biomass and precautionary 
fishing mortality.84 This reflects the importance of information about the fish stocks to 
avoid the problems that can occur from severe and lasting fishing pressure.         
3.2 THE CONCEPT OF COMMON RESOURCES
Common resources or common property resources are natural resources, like fish, that 
are not managed or owned by a single actor or individual but by a group.85 In this 
sense, according to the common-pool resource theory, "each fisherman will take into 
account only his own marginal costs and revenues and ignores the fact that increases 
in his catch affect the returns to fishing effort for other fishermen as well as the health 
of future fish stocks ... [E]conomic rent is dissipated; economic overfishing, which 
may also lead to ecological overfishing, is the result." 86 This is discussed under 3.1.1 
and what can be the results and the difficult aspects of managing a common resource. 
3.3 THE CONCEPT OF SUSTAINABILITY 
According to the OECD, a sustainable catch of fish can be defined as the "Number 
(weight) of fish in a stock that can be taken by fishing without reducing the stock 
biomass from year to year, assuming that environmental conditions remain the same. 
Different levels of sustainable catch exist for different stock sizes. Maximum 
sustainable catch is defined in reference to the size and composition of a stock that 
make the natural growth of the stock equal to this maximum." 87 When discussing the 
36
concept of sustainability with regards to fish resources, another important aspect is the 
sustainable yield or the maximum sustainable yield. Maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY) in fisheries can be defined as "The highest theoretical equilibrium yield that 
can be continuously taken (on average) from a stock under existing (average) 
environmental conditions without affecting significantly the reproduction process."88 
According to these definitions and figure 2 above, the stock should be able to remain 
relatively constant due to fishing, meaning that the catch of fish should be equal to the 
growth rate, marked as Smsy in figure 2. This could of course fluctuate over time due 
to environmental changes. Another important point to make is that a single stock does 
not live in an isolated area, and is affected by other stocks in a prey-predator 
relationship. In this sense, fishing at a maximum sustainable yield level is a rather 
difficult thing to do. However, the main point should be that the level or the capacity 
of the past and current fishing fleet of the EU has been too high, which is indicated by 
the reduction in fish stocks, and the fact that more effort is needed to catch the same 
amount of fish as earlier. 89 
I will therefore try to discuss the concept of sustainability further in relation to the 
CFP and the challenges it faces. To start this discussion it is important to bear in mind 
that sustainability is often a misunderstood concept, and indicates different things 
according to who is talking about sustainability. In the sense of the CFP, the 
objectives include three different aspects regarding sustainability; economic, 
environmental and social sustainability. Therefore, it is important that we make it 
clear that we cannot achieve one of them without taking into consideration the two 
others. For this reason we need to achieve all three objectives simultaneously. Before 
discussing this further, we need to mention that sustainability alone indicates the most 
basic level, namely survival sustainability, which "...involves the maintenance of 
ecological life-support systems, the social capacity to solve major problems and the 
economic capacity to meet subsistence needs of the population. At this basic level of 
sustainability all three requirements must be met simultaneously." 90 Further, we have 
the dimension of intergenerational and intragenerational sustainability. The latter 
indicates that the current generation is experiencing survival sustainability, while the 
former entails sustainability by not harming future generations. So if we do not 
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currently have survival sustainability, how will we then be able to make sure we have 
intergenerational sustainability?91 
Therefore, in the sense of the CFP, the concept of sustainability implies survival of 
fish stocks, economic sustainability and social sustainability. This includes that the 
fish resources are exploited at a level not harming their future survival, and 
simultaneously having economic profitability and maintain the regions dependent on 
the fisheries. 
In the following chapter I will analyze the effects of changes made in the CFP.  
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Figure 2: Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)
4. ANALYTICAL PART
This chapter presents an analysis of the CFP and the changes made throughout its 
lifetime since the start in 1983 until today, with focus on area IV, the North Sea, with 
regards to fish catch and quotas. However, I will first look at the European Union as a 
whole when analyzing the fish fleet, followed by a closer look at some of the 
important member states. Section 4.1 starts by discussing some important aspects with 
regards to the objectives of the CFP, in addition to identifying the most important 
changes made under the CFP to use them as checkpoints for how they have had effect 
on the fishing fleet and catches.  
4.1 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CFP 
In order to fully understand steps taken by the CFP, this chapter starts with a 
discussion of their stated objectives. Objectives can be defined as "...something that 
one's efforts or actions are intended to attain or accomplish."92 This is the basic 
definition of an objective, but in addition we can prioritize the objectives. Dividing 
them into ultimate objectives, being the objective with the highest priority, and 
intermediate objectives, which can be understood as political goals set to achieve the 
ultimate objectives. To be able to distinguish between the two, I will call intermediate 
objectives instruments, as instruments are used to achieve the ultimate objectives. 
Hence I understand the main objectives of the CFP as the ultimate objectives, which 
became more specified after the 2002 reform. The instruments used to achieve these 
objectives have been changing to a higher degree, generally becoming more diverse, 
including more aspects to achieve the ultimate objectives. Finally, I will mention 
incentives, since this is how all stakeholders in the fishing sector are included in the 
process of achieving the ultimate objectives. To illustrate, an example; the balance 
between available fish resources and fishing capacity is an ultimate objective with 
some constraints regarding both conservation of fish stock in a sustainable manner 
and limitations on fishing effort. In this case, the instrument should be to use 
measures to reduce the fleet capacity, since increasing fish resources can only be done 
by limiting the human effect on fish resources, fishing. But to be able to reduce the 
fleet capacity, politicians need to create incentives for the fishermen or fishing 
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companies, so that it will be possible to reduce the fleet and satisfy the fishermen 
owing the boats simultaneously. 
Below, I have examined the changes made in the CFP in order to distinguish between 
ultimate objectives, constraints, instruments and incentives used in the CFP. 
In 1983, the ultimate objectives were;
• Preservation of fish stocks
• Protection of the marine environment
• Economic viability of the European fishing fleet
• Guarantee of income and employment for fishermen
• Provide consumers with quality food
• Relative stability
The constraints I can identify from these ultimate objectives are;
• Restrictions or constraints tied to preservation of fish stocks, implying limits on 
fishing to maintain these, in addition to constraints on the methods of fishing to be 
able to protect the marine environment. 
• The ultimate objectives set constraints tied to the restructuring of the fishing fleet, in 
the sense that fishermen should have a guarantee of income and employment. 
• Furthermore, the ultimate objective has constraints tied to the market and the 
consumers. That the market should be provided with quality food implies a stable 
supply of fish products that can meet the quality requirements. 
• The final ultimate objective sets constraints tied the distribution of quotas and 
national TACs, which are based on a historical percentage of past fishing activity. 
The main instrument used to achieve these objectives was; 
• The use of catch management and more specifically the use of TACs and quotas to 
reduce the fleet capacity in order to achieve the ultimate objective of preserving fish 
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stocks. The rest of the instruments are tied to the use of TACs and quotas, regarding 
control of landings and log-books.93 
The next change was made in 1992, and added the following to the ultimate 
objectives;
• Balancing the fleet capacity and catch potential.
The constraints tied to this ultimate objective are the limit of fishing effort and the 
preservation of fish resources. 
Following the added objective, the instruments used were;
• Reduction of the fishing fleet, accompanied by structural measures to ease the 
social impact of reducing the fleet. This is in line with the ultimate objectives 
and within the constraints. 
• In addition, a licensing system was introduced to prevent new vessels from 
entering the fleet. 
The last change to the objectives came in the 2002 reform, and changed the ultimate 
objectives;
• "...sustainable use of living aquatic resources from an environmental, economic and 
social point of view in a balanced manner. Sustainability has to be based on sound 
scientific advice and on the precautionary principle."94 
According to this ultimate objective, none of the three aspects mentioned, 
environmental, economic and social, can be given less importance than the others. 
Hence the following instruments were introduced;
• Multi-annual recovery plans for fish stocks already outside safe biological limits, 
and multi-annual management plans for other stocks, to prevent further 
overexploitation and reach the balance between fleet capacity and available 
resources. 
• Public aid to the fleet was reorientated in the matter of restricting it to be given only 
for improving safety and product quality, change to more selective fishing gear to 
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prevent by-catch or to equip vessels with vessel monitoring systems (VMS) to 
improve control. 
• Structural aid to fishermen affected by the restructuring of the fishing fleet was 
extended, in addition to aid for early retirement.95
• Use of marine protected areas to protect spawning grounds for fish stocks outside 
safe biological limits. 
• The creation of a Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) and the RACs. 
Hence, this was the most severe change in the CFP with regards to the instruments 
implemented to achieve the ultimate objectives. 
I will discuss the effects of these changes further in the following part with regards to 
the fishing fleet, catches, advice from the ICES, environmental factors, compliance 
with important elements of an ecosystem approach and economic viability.
4.2 CRITICAL EVENTS IN THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY
In this part I will select and discuss some of the most important events and changes in 
the CFP and use these as a basis for my analysis of the effects of the measures used 
under the CFP. Since finding data is a critical factor in being able to compare and 
analyze the effects of the CFP, I will not give too much importance to the early 
changes made in the CFP, as the availability of these data are limited. I will therefore 
start with the review in 1992, followed by the inclusion of Spain and Portugal into the 
CFP in 1996, the 2002 reform, and finally look at the current situation before the 2012 
reform. I have selected these events since these represent the most important and 
largest changes were made, as mentioned in chapter 4.1, in addition to the crucial 
factor of the availability of data. Further I will also look at the available information 
for catches and fleet size, and see if there are other important changes in the data and 
try to find the reasons for these changes. 
4.3 ANALYSIS 
I have selected to divide this part into five, starting with an analysis of the EU fishing 
fleet, followed by catches and the relationship between the ICES advice and the 
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agreed TAC by the Council, before I look at environmental factors and whether or not 
the EU has implemented the necessary elements for complying with an ecosystem 
approach. Finally, I will look at the economic development of the EU fishing fleet. 
4.3.1 The EU fishing fleet
This section starts by examining the effects of the changes made under the 1992 
review. The most important change in 1992 was the new measures to help downsizing 
of the fishing fleet. As mentioned in chapter 2.9, new structural measures were 
introduced to ease the effect of reducing the fleet. To check whether or not these 
measures had an effect on the fishing fleet, I will look at the period before the review 
and until the 2002 reform, as such tend to have a gradual implementation. Figure 3 
that follows is based on data from Eurostat (this also applies for the rest of the figures 
in this section)96;
The periodic increases we can see around 1995, 2004 and 2007 can be explained by 
the accession of new member states, which naturally adds new vessels to the fishing 
fleet. I have selected to exclude the year 1990, as data on all members of the EU for 
this year is not available. As we can see from figure 3 above, there is an overall 
downward sloping trend in the total number of fishing vessels in the EU. After the 
review in 1992, there is a more rapid decrease, while in 1995 it increases due to the 
Figure 3: Total number of fishing vessels (all tonnage classes)
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accession of Finland and Sweden. However, since the accession of Finland and 
Sweden and until the reform in 2002, there is a reduction by approximately 13 750 
vessels, or 13,2 % of the total European Union fishing fleet. Later, the reduction made 
since the 2002 reform until 2010 amounts to 7 % or 6 300 vessels, half the reduction 
made between 1995 and 2010. The reform changed the objectives and gave equal 
importance to economic, environmental and social aspects. The reason why the 
reduction in number of fishing vessels was lower after the reform may be due to less 
aid to compensate for decommissioning of vessels. To see which member states 
contributed to the largest reductions we need to look at each country;
From figure 4 we can see that the five countries with the largest fleets, in terms of 
numbers; Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the United Kingdom made the largest 
reductions after the 1992 review until the reform in 2002, but also in the period after 
the reform. The reason for these reductions may be due to the fact that Spain and 
Portugal were not allowed to be part of the CFP until 1996, and hence made the 
necessary reductions to be accepted as members of the CFP. The continuous 
reductions made by these countries after the reform may be due to the characteristics 
Figure 4: Total number of fishing vessels by member states (all tonnage classes)
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of a larger fleet in terms of number of fishing vessels. Overall, there is a downward 
sloping trend, but the rest of the countries have not made the same reductions as the 
five mentioned, and before the reform in 2002 they tend to have a larger fleet than 
before the 1992 review. What is curious is the sudden increase in the number of 
fishing vessels in Denmark, which later results in a larger fleet, in terms of number of 
boats, than before the 1992 review. In addition to this, the UK has the same increase, 
but before 1992, but contrary to Denmark, they end up with a smaller fleet than before 
the review. The reason may be a change in the definition of fishing vessels, hence 
including more boats without discussing this further. In addition to looking at the 
number of vessels, I will also have a look at the total gross tonnage (GT) and the total 
power in kilowatt (kW) of the fleet. 
From figure 5, all member states have a relatively stable fleet in terms of total gross 
tonnage, except for Spain which during the period from 1991 to 1996 has reduced the 
size of its fleet, in terms of GT, by approximately 200 000 GT. The reason for this 
drastic reduction by Spain, in terms of tonnage, may be due to the fact that they in 
1996 demanded the right to be part of the CFP, and did the necessary restructuring in 
Figure 5: Total Gross Tonnage (GT) of fishing fleet by member states (all tonnage classes)
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order to become fully members and have access to the other member states fishing 
zones. The reason why the rest of the member states have not reduced their fleet in 
terms of tonnage, may be due to the removal of small vessels before the larger ones. 
Still, after 2002, Spain made further reductions in terms of total tonnage, which may 
be due to its size being double the other member states' fishing fleets. Figure 6 
illustrates the changes in terms of power (kW) of the fishing fleet.
In terms of power, Spain still comes out with the largest fishing fleet, as well as the 
largest reductions. But to see whether or not the total reduction has been sufficient, we 
need to look at the reduction in the number of fishing vessels in relation to the 
reduction in power and tonnage. To do that I will look at the change in average size of 
fishing vessels in terms of gross tonnage (GT) and power (kW). 
Figure 6: Total Power (kW) of fishing fleet by member states (all tonnage classes)
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If we look at figure 7 above, we can see that the average size of fishing vessels is 
more or less stable with only minor changes. We can assume that there is an overall 
trend of reducing all tonnage classes proportionally, since the average size is quite 
constant. 
The average size of vessels in terms of power from figure 8 is also quite stable which 
indicates the same as above regarding gross tonnage. This means that the EU has been 
able to reduce the fleet capacity, and not changing the characteristics of the fishing 
Figure 7: Average size of fishing vessels in terms of GT
Figure 8: Average size of fishing vessels in terms of power (kW)
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fleet. Therefore the use of effort management, reducing the time allowed at sea, or by 
reducing the TAC through catch management could have been a more effective way 
of reducing fleet capacity as the imbalance between fish resources and fleet capacity 
seems to remain. 
4.3.2 Catches, TAC and the ICES advice
In this part I will have a look at data from the ICES to check the development and 
changes in quotas set for the most important commercial fish stocks in the North Sea, 
area IV. First, I will illustrate total catches for all fishery products in the EU, starting 
with the founding members, adding new nations when they became members of the 
EU. This will often be visible with an increase in total catches (based on numbers 
from Eurostat)97; 
In figure 9 I have selected to add a polynomial trend line of fourth degree to illustrate 
the development of the total catches of fish in the EU. In addition, I have marked 
some of the main events related to the CFP. In 1976 began the formal negotiations of 
the CFP, and until the formal start in 1983, the catches increased and continued to do 
so until after the 1992 review. Since then there has been a decreasing trend in catches. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that some of the increases are due to 
accession of new member states, like the significant increase in 1973, when Denmark, 
Figure 9: Total catch in all fishing areas by the European Union, including new members
48
Ireland, and the United Kingdom became members of the EU, and later in 1986 when 
Portugal and Spain joined. This does only illustrate the overall picture of total catches, 
and not the possible effects of changes made in the CFP, mainly in 1992 and 2002. 
Hence it makes more sense to have a look at the development of catches regarding the 
EU-15, consisting of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom (also based on numbers from Eurostat, endnote 97);
Figure 10 shows another picture of increasing catches until the start of the 1980s, 
followed by decreasing catches during the lifetime of the CFP. However it is difficult 
to conclude whether or not this is due to lack of fish resources or measures used as 
part of a precautionary approach to the CFP. 
To check whether or not these changes have had an impact on catches, indicating an 
adjustment in the TAC set for each fish stock, I will concentrate on the main 
important fish stocks in the North Sea (area IV), and look for changes in catches, 
quotas and other measures used under the CFP. 
The species I have selected to check for are chosen with regards to available 
information and data from the ICES and Eurostat, and are mainly used for human 
Figure 10: Total catch in all fishing areas by the European Union (EU15; first 15 member states)
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consumption; cod, haddock, herring, plaice, sole, and whiting. I will start by looking 
at some of the advice given by the ICES regarding these fish stocks. The advice given 
by the ICES is mainly connected with the 2002 reform. Since the catches began to 
decrease after 1995, it may be due to other reasons than only new measures 
introduced to create a balance between fishing capacity and available fish resources. 
Therefore, I will start by looking at the advice given by the ICES in 2004, and later 
check for effects in catches before and after this advice was given. 
The ICES stressed the agreement made by the EU and Norway in 1999, on a long-
term management plan for cod to reduce fishing within safe biological limits, had not 
been effectively implemented. 
From figure 11, the catch statistics on cod from the ICES above (in addition to the 
following figures on total catches in this section)98, we can see that the catch of cod 
was rapidly increasing during the 1960s and until the beginning of the 1970s. This 
diagram includes catches from all actors fishing in the North Sea registered by the 
ICES and is based on data used in Eurostat. The countries included in the statistics are 
Belgium, Denmark, Faeroe Islands, France, Germany, Greenland, Iceland, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
Scotland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), later Russia. If we 
look at the diagram above, we can see that around the official start of the CFP in 
Figure 11: Catch of Atlantic cod in area IV (the North Sea) 
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1983, the catch of Atlantic cod in area IV has been decreasing down to a level lower 
than in 1950. It seems unlikely that the only reason for this relatively rapid decrease is 
solely due to the precautionary approach selected by the EU. Another possibility may 
be the fact that catches first started to decline as a result of lower productivity of the 
fish stock because of overfishing. This is what the ICES stressed in their 2004 report, 
stating that the reproductive capacity of the stock was reduced due to unsustainable 
harvesting of the cod stock in the North Sea.99  
By looking at the relationship between the advised and agreed TAC in figure 12, the 
reductions made by the EU in setting a TAC complies with the advice from the ICES 
until 2000. The EU did not follow the advice on closing the cod fishery in 2003, and 
they even increased the TAC from 2001 to 2002, when the ICES recommended a 
lowest possible catch. Nonetheless, we cannot conclude that the only reason for lower 
catches of cod in the North Sea is that the EU failed to follow advice given by the 
ICES.  
The reduction in the stock of Atlantic cod may be caused by other factors than solely 
the indication of overfishing. Climate change is a hot topic, but how can it be 
affecting fish stocks? The change in ocean temperatures and changing currents can 
have significant effect on fish stocks, and a negative correlation between ocean 
Figure 12: the ICES advised and agreed TAC of cod in area IV 
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temperatures and catch of Atlantic cod in the North Sea has been proven100, as shown 
in figure 13 below;
Therefore, it is appropriate to examine other fish stocks before concluding that 
overfishing alone is causing reductions in fish stocks. However, the combination of 
increasing ocean temperatures and that the EU has been unable to counteract the 
overcapacity of the EU fishing fleet, and the lack of sufficient measures to reduce the 
fishing mortality on certain vulnerable stocks have had a negative impact on fish 
stocks. In 2003, the ICES advised closure of the cod fishery in area IV, and we can see 
a reduction of catches in figure 11. However, a low TAC of 27 300 tonnes was set by 
the European Council, not following the advice by the ICES. Not even the following 
year the TAC was set to zero, even though the advice from the ICES was zero 
catches.101 This indicates the importance of scientific advice, but even more 
importantly, that decision-makers listen to and follow advice given. Hence the 
reduction in catches may be caused by the lack of fish resources rather than measures 
taken as part of the precautionary approach. 
Another example is European plaice fished in area IV; 
Figure 13: Correlation between temperature and catches of North Sea cod 
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From figure 14 we can see a positive trend in catches until the beginning of the 1990s, 
followed by a reduction in catches. 
If we look at the advice given by the ICES102 in figure 15, they advised an increasing 
TAC until 1994, while the European Council agreed on the advised TAC or a higher 
TAC. This is also the case in the years after 1994, even though the ICES advised on a 
lower TAC.103 In 2004 the ICES recommended a recovery plan for European plaice, 
Figure 14: the ICES advised and agreed TAC of cod in area IV 
Figure 15: the ICES advised and agreed TAC of plaice in area IV 
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which only led to minor reductions in the agreed TAC, higher than what advised by 
the ICES.  
If we have an overall look at the difference between the ICES advised TAC and the 
agreed TAC on by the European Council on cod, haddock104, herring105 , horse 
mackerel106, nephrops107, Norway pout108, plaice109, saithe110, sole111, sprat112 and 
whiting113 in figure 16, we see that the general trend is a higher agreed TAC than what 
is advised by the ICES. We should take into account that this figure may be 
misleading; however it does illustrate an overall picture of the relationship between 
ICES advice and agreed TAC. A summary of total catches of other fish stocks in the 
North Sea and the relationship between ICES advice and agreed TAC can be found in 
Appendix 5.1. In some cases as in figure 29, TAC and advice from the ICES on sole 
in area IV are relatively equal with only minor differences. However, the overall trend 
is that the agreed TAC by the Council tend to be higher than the ICES advice, and in 
case of coherence, the agreed TAC seems to be lagging some years behind the ICES 
advice, as shown in figure 12 and 15, in addition to figure 25 and 31 for haddock and 
whiting. Furthermore, all catches are at a lower level in 2010 than in 1950, indicating 
that the increase in catches in the time between have had a negative effect on fish 
stocks, reducing their reproductive capacity, as shown in figure 24, 26 and 28, in 
addition to figure 11 and 14.
Figure 16: Total difference between the ICES advised and agreed TAC in area IV 
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From the two examples we can see a tendency of the Council not following the 
scientific advice given until the fish stock is in serious danger of reducing 
productivity. But before we can conclude that the reason for reductions in fish 
resources is due to higher TACs than advised by the ICES, we have to look at other 
factors that might be affecting fish stocks. Environmental factors, like climate change, 
may affect all fish stocks in some way, and not only the negative correlation between 
ocean temperature and cod in the North Sea. 
4.3.3 Environmental factors
Reductions in overall catches are a fact, and more fish stocks have been proven to be 
overfished. This is illustrated by the map from the European Environmental Agency 
(EEA) regarding the number of stocks within and outside biological safe limits114;
From figure 17 we can see that the North Sea is the region with the largest amount of 
assessed fish stocks, hence the scientific advice given on stocks in this region is closer 
to the real situation. However, still there are fish stocks exposed to the risk of reduced 
productivity due to overfishing, approximately 27% of assessed fish stocks in area IV. 
Hence I will check if environmental factors can affect fish stocks, and not the fishing 
pressure alone. The main climate parameters affecting the ocean are temperature, 
which I mentioned in the previous section, turbulence and light conditions. 
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Turbulence changes with the wind, hence affects drifting organisms like plankton, 
which is also affected by currents. Light conditions affects the production of plankton, 
more light increases the availability of plankton. However, the most important 
parameters are temperature and ocean currents, since fish stocks are dependent on 
ocean currents for the movement of larvae from spawning grounds to nursery 
grounds.115 If currents change due to climate changes, fish stocks need to find new 
spawning grounds which can have severe effects on fish stocks. In addition to 
currents, the ocean temperature can also affect fish stocks, as illustrated with cod. 
Temperature is important because it affects all the elements of an ecosystem, hence 
affects fish stocks indirectly in the sense of the availability of food and directly 
regarding productivity. 
In the North Sea, temperature has been rising and was 1-2 °C higher than normal in 
2007. To what extent this has been affecting the main fish stocks in the North Sea is 
difficult to determine, however, we cannot exclude climate change as an important 
element needed to study closer. Reduced catches can be due to lower productivity 
caused by a combination of increasing temperature and overfishing. The latter is 
subject to discussion as the definition of overfishing itself may be shifted and adjusted 
over time and is not constant. If the target objective on preserving a fish stock  has 
been changed, taking into account climate change, a fish stock can be classified has 
overfished if the TAC is not adjusted to meet the new objective. 
Environmental factors will not be discussed in further depth, as it is a rather 
comprehensive area which is outside the scope of this thesis. They are only mentioned 
as a possible element affecting marine ecosystems in relation to fishing. 
4.3.4 Analysis of the ecosystem approach under the CFP
The list of important elements for a successful ecosystem approach according to the 
FAO is long116 , hence I will select the elements I regard as most important, and where 
the CFP has not introduced necessary measures to comply with an ecosystem 
approach. 
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The selected elements are:
• Management objectives are societal choices
• Decentralization of decision and action to a local level, in addition to a higher level 
of coordination
• Balance between available fish resources and fishing capacity
• Transparency, public awareness and consensus building
• Effective mechanisms for conflict resolution and enforcement
• Decision making based on scientific advice
• Short- and long-term management objectives
• Ensure both human and ecosystem well-being
• Prevent overcapacity, IUU, by-catch and discards
And are discussed in more detailed below.
The first element discussed deals with the objectives of the CFP. The FAO says 
"...that management objectives are a matter of societal choice."117 With regards to this 
element, the societal choice means that it depends on the European society to make a 
decision regarding the objectives in the CFP, including all stakeholders such as 
member states, fishermen, the fishing industry, regions dependent on fishing and 
consumers. The main objectives include economic, environmental and social aspects, 
and stress the point of equal importance of all aspects. This may be the point where 
the CFP has failed, since the objectives may be perceived as unclear to certain 
stakeholders. 
The second element is decentralization of decision and action to a local level, at the 
same time as the actions and decisions taken are consistent and coordinated at a 
higher level. In this sense, the creation of the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) in 
the 2002 reform decentralized part of the decision making, but only in agreement with 
the higher level, meaning the European Commission or the Council. The involvement 
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of local fishermen and other stakeholders in the RACs has led to further 
decentralization. However, whether the voice of the stakeholders involved in the 
RACs is heard is another question. For the decentralization to be effective, the 
inclusion of all stakeholders is crucial, in addition to the communication between the 
RACs, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council. 
The next element includes the importance of matching the boundaries of the fleet 
capacity and the fish resources. This is even stated as part of the objectives of the 
CFP, and should therefore be part of the management. Hence the measures introduced 
should be set to comply with the objectives. However, this is not necessarily the case, 
as the analysis above has illustrated. The reasons for this are several and I will come 
back to some of them when discussing the following elements. 
"Introduce measures to ensure transparency, public awareness and consensus 
building."118 This element includes involvement of the public and the availability of 
information. Today, it is easy to access information regarding statistics, policies and 
regulations. This is an important element when introducing new measures to comply 
with the ecosystem approach to fisheries management, since to be able to effectively 
change the CFP, the involvement of all stakeholders is crucial. Everybody needs to 
understand the content of the objectives set for the CFP, hence the translation of the 
ultimate objectives of the CFP into more operational objectives is important. 
Another important element is the establishment of more effective mechanisms for 
conflict resolution and enforcement. This has been one of the main problems with the 
CFP since its creation in 1983. The problem is that all the changes proposed by the 
Commission have not effectively been implemented due to the fact that the European 
Parliament and the Council is more aware of each member states' interest than the 
common interest of a common fisheries policy. To change this, a proposition of more 
power to the Commission can be a more effective way of managing the CFP. 
Furthermore, the FAO stresses the importance of scientific advice in decision making. 
This is an element the EU has not been able to carry out, which is reflected in the 
mismatch between the advised TACs by the ICES and the agreed TACs in the 
Council. The agreed TACs reflect the difficulties of forgetting about the individual 
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member states' interest and setting a TAC that could result in a better basis for an 
economic sustainable fishing industry. 
The next step is to introduce both short and long term management objectives. This 
element has been implemented by introducing multi-annual recovery plans as well as 
management plans. But an important aspect regarding this element is the annual 
decision on TACs, which is discussed at the end of December by the Council. 
Therefore, the multi-annual management plans are failing to secure fishermen with 
stability and knowledge regarding future catches and also resulting in setting a higher 
TAC due to pressure from each member state. 
As mentioned earlier, the objectives giving equal importance to economic, 
environmental and social aspects should also "...ensure both human and ecosystem 
well-being and equitable allocation of benefits, as a condition for compliance."119 
This indicates the crucial element of balancing fleet capacity with available fish 
resources, in addition to distribute the TACs and structural aid fairly among the 
member states. I concluded earlier that this is an element of the ecosystem approach 
to fisheries management where the CFP has not been able to fulfill. This has also 
resulted in the lack of managing the CFP in an economic context. To manage the CFP 
in an economic context implies a reduction of market distortions that have a negative 
impact on biological diversity, which means e.g. the balance between fleet capacity 
and available resources. Furthermore, it should also create incentives for fishermen to 
comply with the objectives regarding conservation and sustainable use of fish 
resources. It is clear that overcapacity of the fishing fleet has led to overfishing, which 
has resulted in a reduction of the productive capacity of fish stocks, lower catches and 
increased costs due to more effort used to catch the agreed TAC. 
The last element regards overcapacity and IUU, in addition to by-catch and discards. 
This is tied to the previous element and stresses the importance of taking uncertainty 
and lack of information about fish stocks into account. Hence collecting information 
on discards and by-catch are important elements in setting appropriate TACs and 
measures to maintain a sustainable use of the resources. In this sense mixed fishery 
management is also important to account for fish getting caught as by-catch. The 
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statistics on by-catch and discards should be included to be better able to determine 
the status of each fish stock. Again, this stresses the importance of the ICES and the 
advice they are giving the EU. 
From this analysis I conclude that the CFP has not yet been able to satisfy the 
necessary elements of an ecosystem approach to fisheries management. However, this 
analysis is based on the past and not on the current reform of the CFP. In the 
Commission staff working document "A Diagnosis of the EU fisheries sector", the 
Commission recognizes most of these deficiencies, and proposes necessary changes to 
adjust the CFP to the ecosystem approach. 
4.3.4 Brief economic analysis of the EU fisheries
To have a further look at the development of the EU fishery I will have a look at the 
economic development of the sector. In the working document of the European 
Commission, they stress the economic importance of the fishery sector in relation to 
certain regions, while the overall economic importance of this sector is decreasing. To 
illustrate this, the total gross value added of fisheries by the EU in 2005 represents 0.1 
% of the total gross domestic product (GDP) of the EU. However, in some coastal 
regions the value added amounts to more than 2 % of the regional GDP. The most 
important fishing nations in the EU are France, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom. 
Together they account for 62 % of the total income generated by the fishery sector in 
the EU. The total value added generated by the catching sector in the EU amounted to 
3.9 billion € in 2005.120 
Another important aspect of the economy is employment, and this makes the fishing 
industry more important than when looking only at the value added to the GDP. Since 
1996 the number of fishermen has decreased by 4 to 5 % annually. In the period 
between 1997 and 2005, total employment in the fishing sector in the EU-15 
decreased by approximately 31 %, while it dropped by 44 % in Spain. Spain is 
therefore the country which has made the largest reductions regarding the fishing fleet 
and employment.121 In the 2010 Annual Economic Report on the European Fishing 
Fleet from the OECD, they write that the main reason for these reductions is reduced 
fishing opportunities.122 If we have a look at the profitability of the Spanish fleet, 
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there seems to be a trend of negative operating cash flow (OCF), however, the lack of 
submitted data by Spain makes it difficult to determine the actual profit. 
The Danish fleet, however, had a positive OCF in the period from 2002-2008, but 
seems to make a loss, which is a result of increased operating costs, e.g. that the price 
of fuel increased in 2008. Regarding 2009 and 2010, the gross value added seems to 
be decreasing further due to lower TACs for the most commercial fish stocks, and if 
prices do not change, this will have a negative impact on the value of landings. 
The profit of the total EU fleet is impossible to determine due to missing data from 
some important member states such as Spain, Ireland and Greece. Therefore, the data 
for profitability of the EU fleet excludes these three countries; however, we can see an 
indication of decreasing or increasing profitability. The gross value added amounts to 
2.1 billion € in 2008, and the OCF amounts to approximately 1 billion €. This is a 
decrease of approximately 23% and 8% respectively from 2007. If we have a closer 
look at the profitability, we can see from figure 18 below that there is a decreasing 
trend123;
The data used in figure 18 excludes Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal (including 
Madeira and the Azores) and Spain. Predictions for 2009 and 2010 show further 
reductions in TACs, reducing the fishing opportunities for certain important 
Figure 18: The European Union fleet profits 
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commercial stocks. This will again affect employment and possible earnings of the 
EU fishing fleet.  
4.4 COMPARING WITH NORWAY
In this section I will compare the CFP in the EU with the fisheries policy in Norway, 
since Norway is the largest fishing nation regarding catches and exporting 95% of 
total production of fish products.124 Figure 19 below illustrates the development in 
quantities of fishing and size of the fishing fleet125;    
Norway has followed the general trend in reducing the number of fishing vessels 
since the 1950s until 2009, while catches have increased. Since Norway shares many 
important commercial stocks in the North Sea with the EU, they are experiencing the 
same problems with reduced catches. The most important fish stocks Norway share 
with the EU are cod, haddock, whiting, saithe, plaice, herring and mackerel, some of 
which are mentioned in the analysis, section 4.3.2. 
The most important difference between the EU and Norway comes to the 
restructuring of the fishing fleet. In terms of number of fishing vessels they have both 
reduced the fleet substantially, while in terms of power and gross tonnage, the trend in 
Norway differs from the EU126; 
Figure 19: Development in number of vessels, number of fishermen and fishing quantities.
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From figure 20 above, we can see that the total gross tonnage and power increased 
until 2001, while it decreased until 2010, ending with a slightly larger fishing fleet 
compared to 1997. This is also reflected by increasing trend in average gross tonnage 
and power as shown in figure 21 and 22127.
Figure 20: Total gross tonnage and power of the Norwegian fishing fleet
Figure 21: Average size of fishing vessels in terms of GT
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Figure 21 shows that Norway has not effectively reduced their fleet capacity in terms 
of average gross tonnage of fishing vessels. They have actually increased their 
capacity from an average of approximately 26 GT to 58 GT, which is more than twice 
the capacity in terms of gross tonnage per vessel. 
In terms of power, figure 22, we have the same case as with GT, indicating a doubling 
of individual vessel capacity in terms of power and gross tonnage. To explain this 
development, we need to look at the history of the fleet, which has changed 
dramatically after World War II. The Norwegian fleet earlier consisted of smaller 
vessels operating mainly in the coastal area of Norway. Through government 
buybacks and retirement of licenses while at the same time preventing accession of 
new vessels through the system of licenses this changed, making the fleet larger in 
terms of average GT and power, and changing part of the fishery from the coastal area 
to the high seas.128 This is reflected in the total catch by Norway in figure 23 below129;
Figure 22: Average size of fishing vessels in terms of power (kW)
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As we can see from figure 23, there is a remarkable increase in catches from the 
1950s to the mid 1960s. The increase is more gradual in Spain and Denmark, 
indicated by an initially larger fishing fleet in terms of number of vessels, GT and 
power compared to Norway. The last point I will mention in relation to Norway is the 
different characteristics in terms of population and the distance between decision 
making and fishermen. Before Norway discovered oil in the 1960s, the fishing sector 
was an important part of the economy, contributing with approximately 2-5 % of 
gross national product (GNP). Today, the same contribution is less than 1%. 
The main objectives of the fisheries policy in Norway is "...sustainable harvesting, 
multi-species approach, adequate regulations and an efficient control and 
enforcement scheme."130 This differs from the objectives of the CFP, since they do not 
specify the need for control in the overall objective. In addition, there is a problem in 
specifying who should be controlling the fisheries under the CFP, the member states 
or a common independent organization. In comparison with the member states of the 
EU, Norway has a large fisheries administration, in order to enforce the regulatory 
system. Hence it is easier for Norway to regulate and introduce necessary measures to 
deal with changes, e.g. the closing off certain areas if catches contain large amount of 
small fish or by-catch leading to discards.131 
The last important point that distinguishes the Norwegian fisheries policy from the 
EU is the use of transferable quotas. It is permitted to trade quota allocation with 
Figure 23: Total catch in tonnes by Denmark, Norway and Spain
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other fishing vessels within the regulatory group (11-15 meters, 15-21 m, 21-28 m, 
larger than 28 m, purse seiners and trawlers) and keep a part of it, where an upper 
limit applies, for 20 years. After this period the quota reverts to the common pool for 
the vessel group. In addition, regarding the purse seine fleet, there is a 40 % loss of 
transferring the quota from north to south, while only 5 % the other way. Transferable 
quotas makes the Norwegian fleet able to restructuring the fishing fleet to consisting 
of fewer boats that can be better utilized and are capable of handling the natural 
fluctuations of fish stocks in the Norwegian Sea, the North Sea and the Barents Sea, 
in comparison with the EU fishing fleet. 
4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The main indication, rather than conclusion, I can make from the analysis is that the 
Common Fisheries Policy in the EU has not been able to manage the fisheries. The 
reasons for this indication are mainly linked to fleet capacity, the availability of 
resources, scientific advice, decision-making, control, management and enforcement. 
The first is linked to managing the balance between fleet capacity and available fish 
resources. Since the Commission has identified that the fishing fleet is oversized, the 
use of efficient effort and catch management could have reduced the fleet capacity 
further. On this point management has failed to enforce necessary measures to balance 
fleet capacity with available fish resources. This is linked to the next point of 
following scientific advice. 
The advice given by the ICES on TACs and measures is crucial in order to maintain 
the balance. Since the decision taken by the Council is not always in line with the 
scientific advice, which contributes to further imbalance between fleet and resources. 
The Green Paper by the Commission underlines many important problems with the 
CFP and proposes changes to better be able to manage the fisheries. However, the 
source of the problem, as I see it, is the Council and the European Parliament being 
the decision-maker regarding quotas and the change to be made in the CFP. Hence, 
the crucial point from my analysis is distribution of management, decision-making, 
control and enforcement, which has pointed me in the direction of the Council. The 
main problem may seem to be the mismatch between available fish resources and 
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fleet capacity, but this is rather a result of the main problem. The main reason why the 
CFP has been unable to manage the fisheries is therefore decision-making, and the 
individual interests of the member states in the Council when deciding on quotas and 
the European Parliament regarding changes to be implemented. 
In addition, it seems that the objectives of the CFP have been well written but not 
translated into how to comply with these goals. Therefore, the current reform is 
necessary due to failures in the past reforms regarding implementation of necessary 
instruments to meet the objectives. 
4.5.1 The Future of the CFP
Regarding the future of the CFP, it depends on the current reform and what kind of 
changes will be decided on by the European Parliament and implemented by the 
Commission and the member states. In a presentation video, the Commission states 
that the main challenge is "...the imbalance; too few fish in the sea and too many 
fishing boats on the sea."132 Hence the objective of the reform is to reestablish 
plentiful stocks, a growing fishing industry and sustainable fishing. Furthermore, they 
will achieve this by the absolute rule of maximum sustainable yield, indicating what 
is explained in chapter 3.3. However, fishing at this level would imply that quotas are 
based on scientific advice that takes into account environmental fluctuations affecting 
the size and availability of fish resources. The Commission says that multi-annual 
plans will become the priority method to enable more stocks to achieve the maximum 
sustainable yield. To this point these plans have only been used for some stocks. 
In addition to reducing the fishing pressure, the Commission proposes that discards of 
by-catch should be gradually banned. However, this will be a first priority for 
commercial stocks, and not other fish stocks taken as by-catch. 
Regarding the problem with too many fishing boats on the sea, the suggestion is to 
introduce the system of transferable catch or effort quotas. This will be similar to the 
system of individual transferable quotas, in the sense that quotas could be grouped 
together on fewer vessels. This would make the fishing fleet more flexible and more 
suitable to meet the challenges of fluctuating stocks and variable catches, in addition 
to reducing the total number of fishing vessels operating on the sea, and increasing the 
67
possible profitability by reducing costs. However, as the Commission is aware, it will 
be important to avoid a concentration of ownership, and this will be done by not 
making the quotas for fishing vessels less than 12 meter long with passive fishing 
gear transferable. Since a lot of coastal regions throughout Europe are dependent on 
fishing, this will maintain the economic viability of these regions. In this sense the 
policy will be divided into two parts, one for small vessels operating in coastal areas 
and another for large scale industrial fishing. The Commission stresses the importance 
of separation between these two parts, since the characteristics are quite different for 
small and large scale fishing. 
Another important part of the reform, and as mentioned as one of the failures of the 
former CFP, is the distribution of decision-making should be decentralized and 
include all stakeholders in the fishing sector in the process of decision-making. The 
European Union will therefore limit its power, and only set the overall objectives and 
schedules of the CFP, while measures to achieve the objectives will be decided by 
member states, involving fishermen in a system of co-management. By involving all 
levels in the fishing sector, fishermen will be given greater incentives to comply with 
new measures since they have been part of the process. This includes the importance 
of the RACs, which could be a possible platform for regional decisions, including 
management of shared stocks, while more national stocks or coastal fishing could be 
regulated by each member state, in compliance with ultimate objectives. 
If all these changes are agreed upon in the European Parliament by the member states, 
the future for the CFP looks brighter. However, the reform implies substantial 
changes, and the history and ability to change of the CFP might limit the possibility of 
a positive development of the fishing sector in the EU. In addition, the financial crisis 
has also affected this already struggling sector, further pressuring and limiting the 
scope of actions. This could also be a potential force in restructuring the sector, as e.g. 
Germany could set demands for changes if they are to help the member states 
struggling the most. 
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4.5.2 Concluding summary
To make a short summary of the main points from the previous conclusion I will start 
by referring to my main question; How has the development of the Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP) in the European Union (EU) changed since it began? The main change 
is measures to help the downsizing of the fishing fleet. In addition, the objectives 
have been changed and specified to meet the new challenges occurring from 
accession of new member states and a downward trend in available fish resources. 
Furthermore, I included three additional questions;  
What are the effects of the changes made in the CFP and are these coherent with the 
objectives of the CFP? 
What are the reasons for the changes and the current reform of the CFP?
How is the fisheries management in Norway compared to fisheries management in the 
EU?
The first, whether or not the changes made are coherent with the objectives, can be 
discussed, but overall the intention of the changes made were coherent with the 
objectives. However, they failed to fully fulfill the objectives and only partly 
completed the wanted effect. The conclusion is that in principle the changes were 
coherent, but not sufficient to complete the objectives. 
Secondly, the reasons for the changes made through the history of the CFP are mainly 
due to accession of new member states, in addition to more available scientific data 
making the imbalance between fishing capacity and available fish resources clearer, 
which is the main reason for the 2012 reform. Furthermore, the economic 
development of the European fisheries also indicates a need for change. 
Finally, it seems that the new reform will make the CFP more similar to the fisheries 
management in Norway. The different ways of management may be due to different 
characteristics of fisheries in the EU and Norway. Furthermore, the development of a 
more similar way of managing fisheries may be due to the sharing of fish resources 
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and that scientific advice has made it clear that cooperation is needed to preserve the 
future of European fisheries.  
5. APPENDIX
5.1 Catch, advised and agreed TAC in area IV 
Total catch of haddock in area IV, the North Sea133, and agreed TAC and advised TAC 
by the ICES134; 
Figure 24: Total catch of haddock in area IV
Figure 25: the ICES advised and agreed TAC of haddock in area IV
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Total catch of Atlantic herring in area IV, the North Sea135, and agreed TAC and 
advised TAC by the ICES136 ;
Figure 26: Total catch of Atlantic herring in area IV
Figure 27: the ICES advised and agreed TAC of herring in area IV
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Total catch of sole in area IV, the North Sea137, and agreed TAC and advised TAC by 
the ICES138;
Figure 28: Total catch of common sole in area IV
Figure 29: the ICES advised and agreed TAC of sole in area IV
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Total catch of whiting in area IV, the North Sea139, and agreed TAC and advised TAC 
by the ICES140;
Figure 30: Total catch of whiting in area IV
Figure 31: the ICES advised and agreed TAC of whiting in area IV
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